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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16582 & 16583 
RICHARD LYNN CARLSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with two counts of possession 
of a controlled substance (heroin and marijuana) with intent 
to distribute for value, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 53-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before the Third Judicial District 
2ou~t, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, sitting without a jury, and 
:o~nd guilty of both counts of possession of a controlled sub-
stance ~ith intent to distribute for value. Appellant was 
sen~enced on July 25, 1979, to two concurrent terms in prison, 
8ne :ro~ O to 5 years and the other from 0 to 15 years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgments of 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THF FACTS 
Although respondent is in substantial agreement wit:. 
appellant's statement of facts, the record reveals the foll~: 
additional facts which are pertinent to the resolution of t~ 
issues presented on appeal. 
First, appellant had been under surveillance and 
suspected of illegal drug-related activity for two months 
prior to the execution of the search warrant. (Tr. 8, Vol. 1). 
Second, items other than pistols, and quantities of 
marijuana and heroin were found during the search of appell~t 
bedroom, including many items used in the production and sale 
of drugs, e.g. substances identified as cutting agents for 
heroin, a plastic bag sealing device and plastic bags the size 
used to bag "lids" of marijuana, a balance scale capable of 
weighing minute quantities of substances, other measuring 
devices (spoons, funnels). (Tr. 13, 14, 20, 40, 41, Vol. 1). 
Third, appellant's bare reference to Deputy George's 
opinion testimony is misleading in its failure to note the 
~eputy's substantial experience upon which that opinion was 
based. Deputy George had been an undercover narcotic officer, 
which included joining the drug culture, buying drugs for a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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predetermined amount of time and,at the conclusion of the undercover 
work, bringing his cases to Court (Tr.7, Vol.l). Deputy George's 
training in narcotics work included schooling at the University 
of Utah and at the police acadamy. Because of his knowledge 
and experience he had prepared a sheriff's office manual on 
narcotics usage and identification (Tr. 15, 16, 37, vol. 2). 
With this background in mind, Deputy George's testimony that 
the amount of narcotics found in appellant's bedroom indicated 
a na~cotics sales operation should be accorded great weight. 
(Tr. 38, 49-51, Vol. 2). 
Fourth Mr. Jerry Campbell, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney, denied under oath having had the discussion with 
police officers during the morning break to which appellant 
testified. (Tr. 89, Vol. 1). This testimony was corroborated 
by Officer Donald Bird (Tr. 108, 109, Vol. 1). Mr. Campbell 
did testify that a conversation was held in his office with 
the evidence custodians relating to the chain problem during 
the noon recess. There were some other officers milling 
around in the office, and there was quite a bit of confusion 
at that time in Mr. Campbell's office. (Tr. 90, Vol. 1). 
Officer Allen Sawaya, one of the evidence custodians, testi-
fied that such conversation was very minor, consisting only 
of .'1r. Campbell telling '"Jfficer Sawaya to make sure he (Sawaya) 
-3-
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had the chain of evidence down (Tr. 121, Vol. 1) . The other 
evidence custodian, Donald Bird, testified that he did not 
recall the specifics of the conversation between himself and 
Mr. Campbell during the lunch hour regarding chain problems 
(Tr. 108, Vol. 1). 
ARGUMENT 
IT IS WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT TO DECIDE THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
FOR A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF AN ORDER 
EXCLUDING WITNESSES. 
• 
In State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936), 
this court considered whether, under an order excluding all 
witnesses from the courtroom except the one presently 
testifying, the trial court abused his discretion by permittin: 
a witness to testify who was in the courtroom while another 
~itness testified. The Court specifically held that it is 
\,·i thin the discretion of the trial court to decide the remedy 
for violating an exclusion order: 
It is a matter within the sound discretion 
of the trial judge as to whether a witness 
who has been present during part or all of 
the examination of any other witness should 
be permitted to testify in the face of an 
exclusion order. 
61 P.2d at 1116. 
Smith, supra, has never been overruled, and its logical basis, 
~hich still obtains today, is discussed below. 
-4-
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The Utah rule for excluding witnesses is found 
in Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1975), § 78-7-4: 
... in any cause the court may, in its 
discretion, during the examination of a 
witness, exclude any and all witnesses in 
the cause (emphasis added). 
It is important to note that the statute says that the court 
"may" rather than that the court "must" exclude witnesses. 
The Utah Supreme Court supports this construction. In State 
v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480 (1928) the court held that 
a trial court may refuse to grant a request to exclude and 
that there is no absolute right to have any witnesses excluded. 
In the recent case of State v. Sanchez, No. 16103 (Utah May 8, 
1980) , this Court noted: 
We have no doubt that in its inherent 
powers as the authority in control of 
the trial the court could exclude wit-
nesses in any case where it appears 
there is good cause for doing so; and 
for the same reason he nay properly 
direct that witnesses not talk to each 
other or to others during the trial. 
Advanced Sheet at 2 (emphasis added). 
This Court has also determined that whether the exclusion 
rule has been violated "is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court." State v. Dodge, 564 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977); see 
also State v. Vaughan, 554 P.2d 210 (Utah 1976). 
Certainly if a trial court has the discretion to 
allow a witness who remaine.9_ in the courtroom and who heard 
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all or part of the testimony of another witness to testify, 
it should have the discretion, in the face of an exclusion 
order, to examine any possible violation of that order, 
and determine what,if any prejudice has occurred, what, if 
any prejudice might occur if the "violating" witness should 
testify, and take appropriate action if any. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it will not dis: 
any decision within the discretion of a trial court unless 
there is a clear showing of arbitrary and capricious abuse of 
tha:. discretion. State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
The presumption is that such discretion was properly exercise: 
Root v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 382, 334 S.W. 2d 154, 157 (1960) 
In the instant case, there was no showing that the trial court 
arbitrarily and capriciously abused his discretion in permitL 
the witnesses to testify when there had been a violation of 
~he exclusion rule. The trial court held a hearinq, determine 
what, if any prejudice might result and judged, in his 
sound discretion, that the witness could appropriately testiL 
The basic rule for accepting or excluding the 
testimony of a witness who has violated the exclusionary rule 
was set forth in Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, (1893): 
If a witness disobeys an order of with-
drawel, while he may be proceeded against 
for contempt, and his testimony is open 
to comment to the jury by reason of his 
-6-
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conduct, he is not thereby disqualified, 
and the weight of authority is that he 
cannot be excluded on that ground merely, 
although the right to exclude under 
particular circumstances may be supported 
as within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. 
Id. at 91 (emphasis added) 
The invocation of the rule excluding and sequestering witnesses 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. 
Dodge, supra. Further, enforcement of the rule fashioning 
an appropriate remedy for a violation, and determining whether 
a violation is prejudicial to the defendant lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Ortiz, 88 N.M. 
370, 540 P.2d 850 (1975); Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 153, 
465 P.2d 394 (1970); State v. Berger, 13 Wash. App. 974, 538 
P.2d 533 (1975). 
At the beginning of the trial in the instant case, 
on motion of counsel for appellant, the trial court invoked 
the exclusionary rule excluding all witnesses from the court-
room, and admonished the witnesses not to discuss their 
testimony about the case with anyone outside (Tr.5,6,Vol.l). 
After the noon recess, counsel for appellant called appellant 
~o the witness stand. Appellant was sworn and testified 
that he had heard State's attorney, Jerry Campbell, discussing 
t~e case with several police officers, witnesses for the 
State, outside the courtroom during the morning recess. 
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Appellant textified that Mr. Campbell walked over to the 
officers seated on a bench and talked to them about the 
necessary chain of evidence: ttWe've got to establish a 
chain." (Tr.84,Vol.l). Mr. Campbell was sworn, and denied 
that the conversation related by appellant had occurred. 
Hr. Campbell's testimony was corroborated by Officer 
Donald Bird. 
Mr. Campbell did have a conversation with the 
evidence custodians in his office relating to the chain 
problems during the noon recess while many other officers 
were milling around causing confusion. One of the 
evidence custodians, Allen Sawaya, testified that such 
conversation was very minor, while the other evidence 
custodian, Donald Bird, testified that he was in the room 
but did not even recall the specifics of the conversation. 
The trial court noted that the ordinary circumstana 
would be that Mr. Campbell certainly might discuss 
individually with the witnesses what their testimony might 
be, but that such discussion with two witnesses together was 
a violation of the exclusionary rule. The trial court 
permitted the evidence to continue, however, subject to 
appellant's motion to strike. 
later denied. 
-8-
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Having personally heard the testimony of 
all concerned,the trial court was able to judge the 
demeanor, the candor, the memory, etc., of the 
witnesses, and was able to weigh the possible 
prejudice, if any. After the full complete hearing 
the judge appropriately allowed the chain of 
possession testimony. 
-9-
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This Court has pointed out many times: 
A finder of fact is not necessarily 
bound to accept as conclusive a testimony 
of a witness. His credibility may be 
impeached by self-interest or improbability 
so that it would be entirely within the realm 
of reason to discount or to entirely discredit 
it. 
Nichol v. Wall, 122 Utah 589, 253 P.2d 355, 356 (1953). 
The appellate court must view whatever inferences 
may be fairly and reasonably drawn from the evidence in t~ 
light most favorable to the verdict (judgment). State v. 
Simpson, 541 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1975); State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2i 
34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959); State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 
208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960). Here, it is a fair and reasonable 
inference that the trial court believed Mr. Campbell's 
testimony that the alleged conversation between him and 
the police officer witnesses allegedly overheard by appellant 
did not in fact occur, and that the conversation had between 
!'Ir. Ca.rnpbell and the evidence custodians during the noon 
recess was only a technical violation of the exclusionary 
rule. 
The case of State v. Presley, 110 Ariz. 46, 514 
P.2d 1234 (1973), presented a factual situation similar to 
that in the instant case. There the witnesses were sworn, 
admonished to remain outside of the courtroom, and also 
admonished to refrain from discussing any of the facts of 
-10-
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the case among themselves or with anyone else except 
the attorneys. The county attorney was aware of the 
exclusion order. Nevertheless, on the second day of 
trial, he got two prosecution witnesses together into 
his office and went over their testimony in the presence 
of each other. The Arizona Supreme Court specifically 
held that since the granting of the sequestration of 
witnesses was within the discretion of the trial court, 
and since the judge could have refused the invocation of 
the rule, a fortiori he could excuse a partial violation 
of it. Even now, although Arizona has changed its rule and 
requires the exclusion of witnesses on request of counsel, 
discretion remains in the trial court to determine what 
sanctions, if any, are necessary for a violation of the 
rule excluding witnesses. State v. Navarrette, 115 Ariz. 
574, 566 P.2d 1050 (1977). 
Appellant would rely on Dodge, supra, as authority 
to support the proposition that where a motion to strike 
or exclude the violating witnesses' testimony is made, as 
was the case here, such motions represent the only remedies 
for a violation by a witness of the exclusionary rule. 
This is a distortion of the Dodge decision. Nowhere in the 
Dodge uecision does this Court suggest that a trial court 
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is without discretion in fashioning the remedy it 
considers proper for a witnesses' violation of the 
exclusionary rule. As the Utah Supreme Court stated 
in Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d 811 (Utah 1972): 
Where the trial is to the court, 
the rulings upon the admissibility of 
evidence are not required to be so 
strict, nor are they of such critical 
importance as where the trial is to 
the jury. This is so because it is 
assumed that the trial judge has 
superior knowledge as to the competence 
and effect which should be given evidence, 
and that he will make his findings and 
d-cisions in conformity therewith. 
Id. at 814. 
Respondent submits that since the sequestration 
of witnesses in Utah is a matter within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and that since the trial court could 
have refused the invocation of the rule, the trial court 
in his sound discretion could excuse a violation of the ru~. 
State v. Smith, supra. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDElJCE FROI1 1\FHICH 
THE APPELLANT COULD BE CONVICTED OF THE 
CRIME OF POSSESSION OF lJARCOTICS WITH THE 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
It is well established in Utah that in order for 
a convicted defendant to succeec in challenging the 
sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he must establish 
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that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial 
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime. State v. 
Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); State v. Wilson, 565 
P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah 
1976). Such cases also establish that in considering 
insufficiency of the evidence in cases with conflicting 
evidence, this Court must assume that the trier of fact 
believed those aspects of the evidence supporting the 
verdict, and also drew the reasonable inferences therefrom 
which support the verdict. 
. . we are obliged to assume on 
appeal that the jury believed those 
aspects of the evidence which support 
the verdict; and that, in doing so, there 
is a reasonable basis therein upon which 
the jury could believe that the defendant 
committed that offense as charged. 
State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064 at 1065-1066 (Utah 1978). 
See also State in the Interest of M.S., 584 P.2d 914 (Utah 
1978), establishing that the same principle applies to 
bench trials. 
The reason for the rule, of course, is that 
the finder of fact is best able and legally responsible 
t · d h d of ~i·tnesses, determine who is o JU ge t e emeanor n 
telling the truth, determine the weight to be given to 
the testimony of each witness, etc. 
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Appellant argues that the evidence did not 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis. In State v. Schad, 
24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970), this Court 
reaffirmed the proposition that a conviction can be 
had on circumstantial evidence if it excludes every 
reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant. 
The Court went on to state: 
Unless upon our review of the evidence, 
and the reasonable inferences fairly to be 
deduced therefrom, it appears that there 
was no reasonable basis therein for such a 
conclusion, we should not overturn the 
verdict. 
Id. at 247. 
Surveying the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favor-
able to the trial court's judgment, it cannot be said 
that a reasonable finder of fact would necessarily enter-
tain some substantial doubt of appellant's guilt. 
In State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978), this 
Court required that the reasonable hypothesis must flow 
from substantial,credible evidence: 
Consequently, if there is any reasonable 
view of the credible evidence which is 
reconcilable with the defendant's innocence, 
it would naturally follow that there would 
be a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. But 
we emphasize that this does not mean just 
-14-
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any view of any of the evidence, however 
unsubstantial or incredible, which a 
party to such a controversy may dream up. 
The proper application of that rule 
requires that it be based upon . 
substantial and credible evidence. This is 
true.because in performing their [its] duty 
as finders of the fact, they are the exclusive 
judges of the credibility of the evidence. 
In so doing they [he) may consider all of 
the facts affirmatively shown, as well as 
any unexplained areas, and draw whatever 
inferences may fairly and reasonably be 
drawn therefrom in the light of their own 
experience and judgment. 
Id. at 412 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the only issue was whether 
the appellant intended to distribute the controlled 
substances,or some part thereof, for value. The 
following evidence clearly supports the court's findings. 
First, appellant constructively possessed the 
controlled substances. Courts have generally held that 
constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence. State v. Floyd, 120 Ariz. 358, 586 P.2d 203 
(1978); State v. Smith, 15 Wash.App. 716, 552 P.2d 
1059 (1976); People v. Newman, 95 Cal.Rptr. 12, 484 
P.2d 1356 (1971). The Utah Supreme Court has detennined 
that the dominion and control of narcotics necessary to 
establish unlawful possession of narcotics neither means 
t~at the 6rug be found on the person of the accused nor 
-15-
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that the accused must have had sole and exclusive possessi~ 
of the narcotic. State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 
P.2d 872 (1964); State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 
P.2d800 (1973). 
Convictions for unlawful possession of controlled 
substances may be based upon evidence that the controlled 
substance(s), while not found on the person of the 
defendant, was in a place under his dominion and control. 
Petty v. People, 167 Colo. 248, 447 P.2d 217 (1968). 
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has held that 
"the accused has constructive possession when he maintains 
control or right to control the contraband," and that 
"possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in 
a location which is irrunediately and exclusively accessible 
to the accused and subject to his dominion and control" or 
which is subject to the joint dominion and control of the 
accused and another. People v. Francis, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 
450 P.2d 591 (1969). The Supreme Court of Arizona has 
determined, in State v. Curtis, 114 Ariz. 527, 562 P.2d 
407 (1977), that constructive possession is sufficiently 
established by proof that a defendant exercised control or 
right to control over the substance itself or the place 
in which the illegal substance was found. The controlled 
substances were found in a search of the appellant's bed~~ 
in the instant case, which bedroom was undisputedly under 
appellant's control or which he had a right to control. 
-16-
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The search of appellant's bedroom yielded 
substantial quantities of marijuana and heroin. The search 
also yielded chemical substances identified by Deputy 
George as cutting agents for heroin, a plastic bag 
sealing device similar to such devices commonly used in 
the drug trafficking business to hermetically seal 
quantities of controlled substances, a balance scale 
capable of weighing minute quantities of substances, 
other measuring devices (spoons and funnels). The 
heroin was found inside an aerosol spray can with a 
false bottom. 
In drawing fair and reasonable inferences 
from the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, the only logical result is that appellant 
possessed the controlled substances. It is also the 
only reasonable inference that appellant intended to 
distribute the controlled substances for value. 
Deputy George testified of his work as an undercover 
narcotic's officer and of his special training in 
narcotics work. George gave as his opinion that the 
heroin and marijuana found in appellant's bedroom were 
large a,~ounts for sale, and not for personal use, that 
the heroin was in a quantity extremely large even for 
a heroin addict, and that a recent drug-selling trend 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the Salt Lake area was towards hermetically sealed 
packages of heroin, such as were found in appellant's 
bedroom. 
The drug measuring and packaging devices 
also point directly and solely to distribution. A 
user does not have to package the drugs he has just 
purchased, which are already packaged by the seller. Also, 
the user does not need to precisely measure the quantities 
he is using. Appellant places much emphasis on the 
testimony of Bill Jenkins, a defense witness and friend 
of appellant, to the effect that he (Jenkins) had left the 
aerosol can containing the packets of heroin at appellant's 
residence before the search; however, Jenkins did not also~ 
left the heroin cutting chemicals, the packaging device, the 
packaging materials, the marijuana, etc. The trial court 
is not required to accept as conclusive the testimony of 
a witness. Nichol v. Wall, supra. The trial court obviousi' 
gave far more weight to the testimony of Officer George 
which reasonably explained all of the facts, than to 
that of the defense witnesses, which left totally unexplainei 
the cutting and packaging paraphernalia. 
This Court, in State v. Bankhead, 514 P.2d 800 
(Utah 1973), held: 
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Circwnstantial evidence may be used 
to prove that the accused possessed the 
narcotics for sale rather than for his 
individual use. The quanitity of the 
heroin involved and the nature of its 
packaging may support the inference that 
it was possessed for sale rather than for 
his personal use. Experienced officers may 
give their opinions in cases involving 
possession of heroin that the narcotics are 
held for purposes of sale based upon such 
matters as the quantity, packaging, and 
normal use of an individual; convictions 
based on such testimony have been upheld. 
Id. at 803 (emphasis added). 
When the total evidentiary picture is viewed, the 
trial court was properly within its authority in finding 
appellant guilty. The language of the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Christean, 533 P.2d 872 (Utah 1975), is 
appropriate: 
. the law does not require 
that the separate bits of evidence be 
viewed in isolation for it is proper 
to take whatever fragments of proof 
that can be found and piece them together 
with the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in order to fill in the whole 
mosaic of the crime. 
Id. at 876. 
The trial court, having considered all the evidence 
and having made all "the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom" was able to weigh "the whole mosaic of the 
crir:ie," and by deliberating with the full picture in mind, 
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determined that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
COlJCLUSIOH 
Whether or not witnesses are excluded from a 
trial is within the discretion of the trial court. If 
some technical violation of an order excluding witnesses 
occurs, it is certainly within the discretion of the court 
to fashion an appropriate remedy if necessary. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a witness 
to the mere chain of custody to testify after a possible, 
non-prejudicial violation of an exclusion order. 
The evidence of the large quantity of drugs and 
concomitant processing and packaging devices possessed by 
appellant were well sufficient to support the court's 
guilty verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
OLGA AGNELLO-RASPA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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